Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/233214
Authors: 
Bos, Olivier
Gomez-Martinez, Francisco
Onderstal, Sander
Truyts, Tom
Year of Publication: 
2021
Series/Report no.: 
ZEW Discussion Papers No. 21-037
Abstract: 
We study the relative performance of the first-price sealed-bid auction, the second-price sealed-bid auction, and the all-pay sealed-bid auction in a laboratory experiment where bidders can signal information through their bidding behaviour to an outside observer. We consider two different information settings: the auctioneer reveals either the identity of the winning bidder only, or she also reveals the bidders' payments to an outside observer. We find that the all-pay sealed-bid auction in which the bidders' payments are revealed outperforms the other mechanisms in terms of revenue, while this mechanism underperforms in terms of efficiency relative to the winner-pay auctions.
Subjects: 
Auctions
Signalling
Experiments
JEL: 
C92
D44
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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