Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/232708 
Year of Publication: 
2020
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 13956
Publisher: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
Research shows that women volunteer significantly more for tasks that people prefer others to complete. Such tasks carry little monetary incentives because of their very nature. We use a modified version of the volunteer's dilemma game to examine if non-monetary interventions, particularly, social recognition can be used to change the gender norms associated with such tasks. We design three treatments, where a) a volunteer receives positive social recognition, b) a non-volunteer receives negative social recognition, and c) a volunteer receives positive, but a non-volunteer receives negative social recognition. Our results indicate that competition for social recognition increases the overall likelihood that someone in a group has volunteered. Positive social recognition closes the gender gap observed in the baseline treatment, so does the combination of positive and negative social recognition. Our results, consistent with the prior literature on gender differences in competition, suggest that public recognition of volunteering can change the default gender norms in organizations and increase efficiency at the same time.
Subjects: 
gender
social recognition
volunteering
low promotability tasks
JEL: 
J16
J71
M12
D91
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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