Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/232449 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 8852
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
In this paper we demonstrate how the impure public good model can be converted into a pure public good model with satiation of private consumption, which can be handled more easily, by using a variation of the aggregative game approach as devised by Cornes and Hartley (2007). We point out the conditions for impure public good utility functions that allow for this conversion through which the analysis of Nash equilibria can be conducted in a unified way for the impure and the pure public good model and which facilitates comparative statics analysis for impure public goods. Our approach also offers new insights on the determinants for becoming a contributor to the public good in the impure case as well as on the non-neutral effects of income transfers on Nash equilibria when the public good is impure.
Subjects: 
impure public goods
warm-glow giving
Nash equilibria
aggregative game approach
JEL: 
C72
D64
H41
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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