Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23221
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dc.contributor.authorJoyce, Joseph P.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:50:58Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:50:58Z-
dc.date.issued2003en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/23221-
dc.description.abstractThis paper presents a model of the implementation of IMF programs, which is empirically tested with data from the period 1975-99. The IMF and the borrowing country are shown to have asymmetric evaluations of a program?s discounted benefits, due to differences in the measurement of the benefits, the relevant time frame and appropriate discount rate. The model also distinguishes between a government that seeks to maximize national welfare and an autocracy that seeks only to benefit the ruling group. The results of the empirical analysis demonstrate that program implementation is affected by a country?s trade openness, the ideological cohesion of the government, the duration of the political regime, and the degree of political openness.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Papers / Wellesley College, Department of Economics |x2003,03en_US
dc.subject.jelF33en_US
dc.subject.jelO19en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordIMF programsen_US
dc.subject.keywordconditionalityen_US
dc.subject.stwAnpassungsprogramm des IWFen_US
dc.subject.stwEntwicklungsländeren_US
dc.titlePromises made, promises broken : a model of IMF program implementationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn396125948en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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