Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/23221 
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dc.contributor.authorJoyce, Joseph P.en
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:50:58Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:50:58Z-
dc.date.issued2003-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/23221-
dc.description.abstractThis paper presents a model of the implementation of IMF programs, which is empirically tested with data from the period 1975-99. The IMF and the borrowing country are shown to have asymmetric evaluations of a program?s discounted benefits, due to differences in the measurement of the benefits, the relevant time frame and appropriate discount rate. The model also distinguishes between a government that seeks to maximize national welfare and an autocracy that seeks only to benefit the ruling group. The results of the empirical analysis demonstrate that program implementation is affected by a country?s trade openness, the ideological cohesion of the government, the duration of the political regime, and the degree of political openness.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aWellesley College, Department of Economics |cWellesley, MAen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWellesley College Working Paper |x2003-03en
dc.subject.jelF33en
dc.subject.jelO19en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordIMF programsen
dc.subject.keywordconditionalityen
dc.subject.stwAnpassungsprogramm des IWFen
dc.subject.stwEntwicklungsländeren
dc.titlePromises made, promises broken : a model of IMF program implementation-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn396125948en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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