Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23220
Authors: 
Chaudhuri, Ananish
Chen, DeeDee
Graziano, Sara
McIntire, Frances
Winkler, Dawn
Year of Publication: 
2003
Series/Report no.: 
Working Papers / Wellesley College, Department of Economics 2003,02
Abstract: 
We study a public goods game where subjects get feedback either continually or intermittently. We find that the intermittent feedback helps to mitigate problems of free riding because subjects in this treatment focus more on a string of choices rather than deciding on a case by case basis as in the continuous feedback treatment.
Subjects: 
Public Goods ; Voluntary Contributions Mechanism ; Patterned Feedback ; Free riding ; Expectations
JEL: 
C72
C92
C91
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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