Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/23218 
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dc.contributor.authorChaudhuri, Ananishen
dc.contributor.authorKhan, Sarah Alien
dc.contributor.authorLakshmiratan, Aishwaryaen
dc.contributor.authorPy, Anne-Laureen
dc.contributor.authorShah, Lisaen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:50:56Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:50:56Z-
dc.date.issued2002-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/23218-
dc.description.abstractWe use a two-person extensive form bargaining game to examine individuals? trusting and reciprocal behavior and how those relate to their scores on a trust survey. In keeping with prior research, we find that the ?self-interested? outcome is rejected by a majority of individuals. People who score high on the trust survey are both trusting and are also trustworthy, in that they reciprocate others? trust. But, people with low trust scores often exhibit trust but are not trustworthy. These ?inconsistent trusters? seem to be interested in exploiting the trust and trustworthiness of others in increasing their own payoff.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aWellesley College, Department of Economics |cWellesley, MAen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWellesley College Working Paper |x2002-10en
dc.subject.jelC91en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordTrust ; Reciprocity ; Social Values Orientation ; Sequential Game ; Bargainingen
dc.subject.stwVertrauenen
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungenen
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen
dc.titleTrust and Trustworthiness in a Sequential Bargaining Game-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn378804235en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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