Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23218
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dc.contributor.authorChaudhuri, Ananishen_US
dc.contributor.authorKhan, Sarah Alien_US
dc.contributor.authorLakshmiratan, Aishwaryaen_US
dc.contributor.authorPy, Anne-Laureen_US
dc.contributor.authorShah, Lisaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:50:56Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:50:56Z-
dc.date.issued2002en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/23218-
dc.description.abstractWe use a two-person extensive form bargaining game to examine individuals? trustingand reciprocal behavior and how those relate to their scores on a trust survey. In keepingwith prior research, we find that the ?self-interested? outcome is rejected by a majority ofindividuals. People who score high on the trust survey are both trusting and are alsotrustworthy, in that they reciprocate others? trust. But, people with low trust scores oftenexhibit trust but are not trustworthy. These ?inconsistent trusters? seem to be interested inexploiting the trust and trustworthiness of others in increasing their own payoff.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Papers / Wellesley College, Department of Economics |x2002,10en_US
dc.subject.jelC91en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordTrust ; Reciprocity ; Social Values Orientation ; Sequential Game ; Bargainingen_US
dc.subject.stwVertrauenen_US
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungenen_US
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen_US
dc.titleTrust and Trustworthiness in a Sequential Bargaining Gameen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn378804235en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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