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dc.contributor.authorPrusa, Thomas J.en_US
dc.contributor.authorSkeath, Susanen_US
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we study worldwide antidumping (AD) case filing patterns in order todetermine the extent to which economic versus strategic incentives explain the behavior of countriesemploying AD actions. We compare four main hypotheses. Two are motivated by the Bagwell-Staiger (1990) model of special protection and are consistent with the view that AD actions are usedto prevent unfair trade: the ?big supplier? and the ?big change in imports? hypotheses. The othertwo hypotheses, tit-for-tat and the club effect, are outside the basic Bagwell-Staiger model and areconsistent with the belief that strategic considerations influence AD actions. We find strong supportthat AD actions are directed at big suppliers, but far weaker evidence that AD actions are filedagainst suppliers whose imports have ?surged.? This finding casts doubt on the view that ADactions are primarily used to stop unfair trade practices because one would expect that suchpractices would be associated with large import gains. We also find very strong evidence that ADactions are used strategically to deter further use of AD and/or to punish trading partners who haveused AD. Our findings reject the notion that the rise in AD activity is solely explained by anincrease in unfair trading.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Papers / Wellesley College, Department of Economics |x2002,05en_US
dc.titleModern Commercial Policy: Managed Trade or Retaliation?en_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US

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