Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/231735 
Year of Publication: 
2020
Citation: 
[Journal:] European Journal of Family Business (EJFB) [ISSN:] 2444-877X [Volume:] 10 [Issue:] 2 [Publisher:] UMA Editorial, Universidad de Málaga [Place:] Málaga [Year:] 2020 [Pages:] 43-60
Publisher: 
UMA Editorial, Universidad de Málaga, Málaga
Abstract: 
Based on the agency theory, this paper analyzes whether family firms pay more dividends compared to no-family firms and identifies whether the board composition affects the dividend policy. Brazil and Chile have established mandatory dividends, retain lower cash holdings, pay higher dividends compared with other markets in the region. The sample of study is composed by 853 observations from 49 Brazilian and 32 Chilean top publicly listed firms in terms of market capitalization over the 11-year period from 2004 to 2014. Using an unbalanced panel data, results indicate that family controlled firms distribute more dividends and board composition namely; board size and the proportion of women on the board have a significant and positive impact on the dividend policy of the firm. By contrast, COB-CEO duality has a negative effect. Thus, dividend policy constitutes an effective corporate governance mechanism in mitigating the family' expropriation of minority shareholders' wealth.
Subjects: 
Dividend policy
Family firms
Board composition
Latin America
Agency theory
JEL: 
L20
O31
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc-sa Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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