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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/23161
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Campbell, Colin M. | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-29T15:49:04Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-29T15:49:04Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2003 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23161 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We explore the relationship between public information and implementableoutcomes in an environment characterized by random endowments and privateinformation. We show that if public signals carry no information about privatetypes, then an exact relationship holds: a more informative public signal structure,in the sense of Blackwell, induces a smaller set of ex-ante implementablesocial choice functions. This holds for a large set of implementation standards,including Nash implementation, and Bayesian incentive compatibility. The resultextends the notion, dating to Hirshleifer (1971), that public informationcan have negative value to an endowment economy under uncertainty. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aRutgers University, Department of Economics |cNew Brunswick, NJ | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aWorking Paper |x2003-03 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Implementation | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Blackwell?s Ordering | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Information | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Risk Sharing | en |
dc.subject.stw | Information | en |
dc.subject.stw | Informationswert | en |
dc.subject.stw | Ranking-Verfahren | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Blackwell's criterion | en |
dc.title | Implementation and Orderings of Public Information | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 362925380 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
dc.identifier.repec | RePEc:rut:rutres:200303 | en |
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