Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/23161 
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dc.contributor.authorCampbell, Colin M.en
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:49:04Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:49:04Z-
dc.date.issued2003-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/23161-
dc.description.abstractWe explore the relationship between public information and implementableoutcomes in an environment characterized by random endowments and privateinformation. We show that if public signals carry no information about privatetypes, then an exact relationship holds: a more informative public signal structure,in the sense of Blackwell, induces a smaller set of ex-ante implementablesocial choice functions. This holds for a large set of implementation standards,including Nash implementation, and Bayesian incentive compatibility. The resultextends the notion, dating to Hirshleifer (1971), that public informationcan have negative value to an endowment economy under uncertainty.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aRutgers University, Department of Economics |cNew Brunswick, NJen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Paper |x2003-03en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordImplementationen
dc.subject.keywordBlackwell?s Orderingen
dc.subject.keywordInformationen
dc.subject.keywordRisk Sharingen
dc.subject.stwInformationen
dc.subject.stwInformationswerten
dc.subject.stwRanking-Verfahrenen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.subject.stwBlackwell's criterionen
dc.titleImplementation and Orderings of Public Information-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn362925380en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:rut:rutres:200303en

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