Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/231482 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2019
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Financial Management [ISSN:] 1755-053X [Volume:] 50 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] Wiley [Place:] Hoboken [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 619-644
Verlag: 
Wiley, Hoboken
Zusammenfassung: 
We study insider trading behavior surrounding the largest bank bailout in history: Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). In politically connected banks, insider buying during the pre‐TARP period is associated with increases in abnormal returns around bank‐specific TARP announcement; for unconnected banks, trading and returns are uncorrelated. Results hold across insiders within the same bank and are stronger for finance‐related government connections. Through a Freedom of Information Act request, we obtained the previously undisclosed TARP funds requested; the ratio of received to requested funds correlates both with abnormal returns and insider buying behavior in connected banks.
Schlagwörter: 
bank bailouts
insider trading
political connections
political economy in banking
TARP
JEL: 
D72
G01
G21
G28
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Dokumentart: 
Article
Dokumentversion: 
Published Version
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