Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/231482
Authors: 
Akin, Ozlem
Coleman, Nicholas S.
Fons-Rosen, Christian
Peydró, José-Luis
Year of Publication: 
2019
Citation: 
[Journal:] Financial Management [ISSN:] 1755-053X [Issue:] Early View Articles
Abstract: 
We study insider trading behavior surrounding the largest bank bailout in history: Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). In politically connected banks, insider buying during the pre‐TARP period is associated with increases in abnormal returns around bank‐specific TARP announcement; for unconnected banks, trading and returns are uncorrelated. Results hold across insiders within the same bank and are stronger for finance‐related government connections. Through a Freedom of Information Act request, we obtained the previously undisclosed TARP funds requested; the ratio of received to requested funds correlates both with abnormal returns and insider buying behavior in connected banks.
Subjects: 
bank bailouts
insider trading
political connections
political economy in banking
TARP
JEL: 
D72
G01
G21
G28
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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