Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/23096 
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dc.contributor.authorSchmidtchen, Dieteren
dc.contributor.authorNeunzig, Alexander R.en
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:36:29Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:36:29Z-
dc.date.issued1997-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/23096-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we analyze whether trust can overcome the contractual hazards caused by the territoriality of law, how effective trust is and what the impact is on the sequential structure of trade. The paper contributes to the New Institutional Economics of International Transactions (NIEIT).en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversität des Saarlandes, Center for the Study of Law and Economics (CSLE) |cSaarbrückenen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCSLE Discussion Paper |x97-05en
dc.subject.jelK12en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordinternational contract enforcmenten
dc.subject.keywordtrust gameen
dc.subject.keywordbounded rationalityen
dc.subject.stwVertragsrechten
dc.subject.stwNationalstaaten
dc.subject.stwInternationales Handelsrechten
dc.subject.stwAußenwirtschaften
dc.subject.stwVertrauenen
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleTrade, Trust And The Territoriality Of The Law-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn359599265en
dc.description.abstracttransIn diesem Paper wird untersucht, inwiefern Vertrauen die durch die Territorialität des Rechts verursachten vertraglichen Risiken mildern kann, wie effektiv Vertrauen ist, und welcherart seine Auswirkungen auf die sequentielle Struktur des Handels ist. Das Paper stellt einen Beitrag zur Neuen Institutionenökonomik internationaler Transaktionen dar (NIIT) dar.en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:csledp:9705en

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