Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/230881
Authors: 
Emrich, Eike
Frenger, Monika
Gassmann, Freya
Hämmerle, Martin
Pierdzioch, Christian
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
Diskussionspapiere des Europäischen Instituts für Sozioökonomie e.V. No. 31
Abstract: 
This paper analyzes the recruitment of executive board members for German sports clubs, an issue of key interest given that volunteers play a dominant role in these sports clubs. Based on a new, micro-level data set, we examine how members of a sports club advance to become executive board members and how board members differ from ordinary members. Based on the results of our study, we examine whether Michels' "iron law of oligarchy" applies and whether democratic procedures for elections in sports clubs are replaced, even in part, by trust-based oligarchic structures.
Subjects: 
Sports
volunteering
oligarchy
sports clubs
executive boards
Ehrenamt
Oligarchie
Sportverein
Vorstand
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/de/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.