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dc.contributor.authorHaucap, Justusen
dc.contributor.authorKirstein, Rolanden
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:36:10Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:36:10Z-
dc.date.issued2001-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/23066-
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyzes the incentive effects of pollution taxes versus pollution permits for a revenue maximizing Government that also pursues environmental objectives. In our model, pollution permits are analyzed as durable goods, and the leasing of pollution permits is seen as an equivalent to a pollution tax. We show that environmental policy based on durable pollution permits can be welfare superior to a pollution tax regime. The intuition is that a monopolistic Government would, in order to maximize its revenues, try to restrict the permit sales below the welfare maximizing level. While a pollution tax or leasing charge allows the Government to credibly commit to a monopoly level of pollution in future periods, a system based on durable permits weakens the monopolistic Government?s ability to credibly restrict future sales. Therefore, a pollution tax regime may be better for the environment and simultaneously increase Government revenues, but social welfare is larger with pollution permits. Hence, a regime where the Government cannot commit to monopoly quantities may be preferable from a welfare economic perspective. This argument in favor of durable permits complements more traditional arguments based on information asymmetries and innovation incentives.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversität des Saarlandes, Center for the Study of Law and Economics (CSLE) |cSaarbrückenen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCSLE Discussion Paper |x2001-06en
dc.subject.jelH2en
dc.subject.jelK3en
dc.subject.jelD7en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordEmissions Permitsen
dc.subject.keywordPollution Taxen
dc.subject.keywordTime Inconsistencyen
dc.subject.keywordDurable Goodsen
dc.subject.stwÖkosteueren
dc.subject.stwEmissionsrechteen
dc.subject.stwDauerhaftes Konsumguten
dc.subject.stwSteuerpolitiken
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen
dc.subject.stwSteueraufkommenen
dc.subject.stwZeitkonsistenzen
dc.subject.stwWohlfahrtseffekten
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleGovernment Incentives when Pollution Permits are Durable Goods-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn503179728en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:csledp:200106en

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