Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/23064 
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorKirstein, Rolanden
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:36:09Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:36:09Z-
dc.date.issued2000-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/23064-
dc.description.abstractThe Basle Accord of 1988 regulates how much equity banks must set aside as a cushion against the default risk. In its 1999 proposal for a new Accord, the Basle Committee seeks to introduce different equity ratios for customers of different risk levels. The proposal strongly favors external ratings as a means of risk determination. German banks, on the other hand, demand acknowledgement of their internal ratings. This paper shows that, even if assumed that banks have better diagnosis skill than external rating agencies, external ratings are better able to implement the goals of the Basle Committee than internal ratings. This is due to a lack of incentives to truthfully reveal their diagnosis results. These incentives may be provided by supervision of internal ratings, even if imperfect and only occasional. However, this requires that a fine be imposed if the supervising authority comes to a result different from the internal rating assigned by the bank.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversität des Saarlandes, Center for the Study of Law and Economics (CSLE) |cSaarbrückenen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCSLE Discussion Paper |x2000-06en
dc.subject.jelD81en
dc.subject.jelK00en
dc.subject.jelG21en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keyworddiagnosis theoryen
dc.subject.keywordimperfect decision makingen
dc.subject.keywordcredit worthiness testsen
dc.subject.stwEigenkapitalvorschriftenen
dc.subject.stwKreditwürdigkeiten
dc.subject.stwÖkonomischer Anreizen
dc.subject.stwKreditgeschäften
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.subject.stwDeutschlanden
dc.titleThe New Basle Accord, Internal Ratings, and the Incentives of Banks-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn503172359en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:csledp:200006en

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.