Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/230598 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2020
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Queen’s Economics Department Working Paper No. 1445
Verlag: 
Queen's University, Department of Economics, Kingston (Ontario)
Zusammenfassung: 
Following the crisis, macroprudential regulations targeting mortgage-market vulnerabilities were widely adopted, their success often depending on intermediaries' responses. We show that Canadian banks behaved strategically to limit the potency of recently implemented mortgage stress tests, requiring borrower qualification based on the mode of 5-year rates posted by the Big 6 banks rather than transaction rates. The government aimed to cool credit markets, but since many mortgages are government-insured, Big 6 interests were not aligned. Using DiD comparing changes in 5-year spreads with 3-year spreads, unaffected by the policy, we find rates were lowered encouraging continued borrowing, muting the tests' impact.
Schlagwörter: 
macroprudential regulation
credit supply
mortgage market
mortgage stress tests
rate-benchmark manipulation
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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