Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/230586
Authors: 
Cotton, Christopher
Hickman, Brent R.
Price, Joseph
Year of Publication: 
2020
Series/Report no.: 
Queen’s Economics Department Working Paper No. 1433
Abstract: 
We develop a model in which many heterogeneous agents invest in human capital as they compete for better college admission slots or employment opportunities. The model provides theoretical predictions about how affirmative action or preferential treatment policies change the distribution of effort, human capital accumulation, and job/college slot allocations across different population groups. Our findings deliver two key insights. First, incentives to invest in human capital depends substantially on the strength of one's competition. Second, we find evidence of a counter-intuitive role for preferential treatment in promoting overall human capital development.
Subjects: 
Large Contest
All-Pay Auction
Affirmative Action
College Admissions
Field Experiment
Human Capital
JEL: 
J15
J24
C93
D82
D44
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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