Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/230567
Authors: 
Agranov, Marina
Cotton, Christopher
Tergiman, Chloe
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
Queen’s Economics Department Working Paper No. 1414
Abstract: 
In models of dynamic multilateral bargaining, the literature tends to focus on stationary subgame perfect or stationary Markov perfect equilibria, which restrict attention to forward-looking, history-independent strategies. Evidence supporting such refinements come from environments in which proposal power is exogenous and the incentives for players to develop cooperative relationships are minimized. However, in many environments including legislative bargaining, agenda setting power is endogenous and it is common place for players to form coalitions and establish reputations. Through a series of lab experiments, we show that in repeated environments, standard equilibrium refinements may predict some aspects of the data when outcomes when proposal power is randomly assigned, but do not predict outcomes when proposal power is endogenous.
Subjects: 
stationary equilibrium
dynamic bargaining
repeated games
laboratory experiment
JEL: 
C78
D02
C92
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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