Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/230562 
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
Queen’s Economics Department Working Paper No. 1410
Publisher: 
Queen's University, Department of Economics, Kingston (Ontario)
Abstract: 
In a model of project design, evaluation, and selection, we explore how the incentives to improve the design of projects depend on the availability of funding and the process of evaluation. We show that project designers (researchers or NGOs) prefer to subject their projects to less-rigorous evaluations than donors or funding agencies would prefer, ex post. We also find that increases in both funding availability and the informativeness of evaluations tend to decrease investments in project quality. By implication, increased availability of funding or more-informative evaluations can lead to the implementation of fewer high-value projects.
Subjects: 
Game theory
Impact evaluation
Pilot studies
Funding allocation
JEL: 
D83
H43
O22
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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