Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/23053 
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorSchmidtchen, Dieteren
dc.contributor.authorKirstein, Rolanden
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:36:02Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:36:02Z-
dc.date.issued1997-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/23053-
dc.description.abstractEven if the expected punishment on tax evasion is negligible, empirical studies show that actual tax evasion is smaller than rational choice models predict. In addition to this, tax payer do not respond on parameter changes as predicted. Some authors tried to explain this puzzle by assuming "tax morale". Our paper models tax payers as imperfect decision-makers and explains deviations from the optimal solution by making use of a weaker assumption: The imperfect tax payer's decision to deviate from a given rule depends on their competence and on the complexity of their situation.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversität des Saarlandes, Center for the Study of Law and Economics (CSLE) |cSaarbrückenen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCSLE Discussion Paper |x97-01en
dc.subject.jelH26en
dc.subject.jelK42en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordtax complianceen
dc.subject.keywordbounded rationalityen
dc.subject.keywordimperfect decision-makingen
dc.subject.keyworddetection skillen
dc.subject.keywordrule-governed behavioren
dc.titleImperfect Decision-Making and the Tax Payer Puzzle-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn503148385en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:csledp:9701en

Files in This Item:
File
Size
192.14 kB
78.55 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.