Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/230499
Authors: 
Zhou, Yu
Serizawa, Shigehiro
Year of Publication: 
2020
Series/Report no.: 
ISER Discussion Paper No. 1095
Abstract: 
We study an assignment market where multiple heterogenous objects are sold to unit demand agents who have general preferences accommodating imperfect transferability of utility and income effects. In such a model, there is a minimum price equilibrium. We establish the structural characterizations of minimum price equilibria and employ these results to design the "Serial Vickrey mechanism," that finds a minimum price equilibrium in a finite number of steps. The Serial Vickrey mechanism introduces the objects one by one, and requires agents to report finite-dimensional prices in finitely many times. Besides, the Serial Vickrey mechanism also has nice dynamic incentive properties.
Subjects: 
The assignment market
minimum price equilibrium
general preferences
structural characterizations
Serial Vickrey mechanism
dynamic incentivecompatibility
JEL: 
C63
C70
D44
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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