Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/230494 
Year of Publication: 
2020
Series/Report no.: 
ISER Discussion Paper No. 1090
Publisher: 
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka
Abstract: 
This article surveys the theoretical literature on legislative bargaining with endogenous status-quo. These are the legislative bargaining situations in which in each period a new policy is decided and the policy implemented in the event of no agreement is endogenously determined by the outcome of bargaining in the previous period. After describing a general framework, we discus bargaining over redistributive policies, bargaining over spatial policies, existence issues, efficiency issues and open questions.
Subjects: 
legislative bargaining
multilateral bargaining
spatial bargaining
redistributive bargaining
endogenous status-quo
dynamic political economy
JEL: 
A3
C7
D7
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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