Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/230475 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2019
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ISER Discussion Paper No. 1069
Verlag: 
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka
Zusammenfassung: 
We analyze firms' decisions to adopt a vertical integrated or decentralized structure taking into account the characteristics of both the final good competition and the R&D process. We consider two vertical chains, where R&D is conducted by upstream sectors. R&D investment determines the production costs of the downstream sector and has spillovers on the rivals' costs. In a general setup, we show that equilibrium organizational structure depends on whether the situation considered belongs to one of four possible cases and we study how final good market competition, spillover, and incentives in innovation interact to determine the optimal vertical structure.
Schlagwörter: 
R&D
Vertical separation
Market structure
Spillover
R&D
Vertical separation
Market structure
Spillover
JEL: 
L22
L13
O32
C72
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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