Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/230466 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2019
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ISER Discussion Paper No. 1060
Verlag: 
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka
Zusammenfassung: 
We develop a general model, with the exponential bandit as a special case, in which high-ability agents are more likely to achieve early success but also learn faster that their project is not promising. These counteracting effects give rise to a signaling model in which the single-crossing condition fails but a double-crossing property holds. We characterize the unique D1 equilibrium under double-crossing condition, and show that it tends to produce pooling. Ability to identify good projects and ability to execute a good project have different implications for the equilibrium allocation. Our model also incorporates public news, which generates dynamic distortions.
Schlagwörter: 
double-crossing property
D1 equilibrium refinement
dynamic signaling
venture startups
JEL: 
D82
D83
O31
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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