Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/230455
Authors: 
Masuda, Takehito
Sakai, Toyataka
Serizawa, Shigehiro
Wakayama, Takuma
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
ISER Discussion Paper No. 1048
Abstract: 
We conduct laboratory experiments for the Vickrey auction with and without an announcement on strategy-proofness to subjects. Although the rate of truth-telling among the subjects stays at 20% without the announcement, it increases to 47% with the announcement. Moreover, by conducting experiments for the pay-your-bid auction, which is not strategy-proof, with and without advice, we find that our experimental results are not attributed to so-called experimenter demand effects. Strategy-proof mechanisms are sometimes criticized because players often fail to find the benefit of truth-telling, but our observations tell that introducing an educative announcement helps them behave "correctly".
Subjects: 
advice effect
strategy-proofness
Vickrey auction
pay-your-bid auction
market design
JEL: 
D44
D71
D61
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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