Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/230279
Authors: 
Friehe, Tim
Mungan, Murat C.
Year of Publication: 
2020
Citation: 
[Journal:] Journal of Public Economic Theory [ISSN:] 1467-9779 [Volume:] [Issue:] [Pages:] n/a-n/a
Abstract: 
This article questions whether excessive policing practices can persist in an environment where law enforcement policies are subject to political pressures. Specifically, it considers a setting where the police decide whether to conduct stops based on the suspiciousness of a person's behavior and the potential liability for conducting a wrongful stop. We establish that the liability level that results in a voting equilibrium is smaller than optimal, and consequently, that excessive policing practices emerge in equilibrium.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.