Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/230279 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Citation: 
[Journal:] Journal of Public Economic Theory [ISSN:] 1467-9779 [Volume:] 23 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] Wiley [Place:] Hoboken, NJ [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 141-157
Publisher: 
Wiley, Hoboken, NJ
Abstract: 
This article questions whether excessive policing practices can persist in an environment where law enforcement policies are subject to political pressures. Specifically, it considers a setting where the police decide whether to conduct stops based on the suspiciousness of a person's behavior and the potential liability for conducting a wrongful stop. We establish that the liability level that results in a voting equilibrium is smaller than optimal, and consequently, that excessive policing practices emerge in equilibrium.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc-nd Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.