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Friehe, Tim
Mungan, Murat C.
Year of Publication: 
[Journal:] Journal of Public Economic Theory [ISSN:] 1467-9779 [Volume:] [Issue:] [Pages:] n/a-n/a
This article questions whether excessive policing practices can persist in an environment where law enforcement policies are subject to political pressures. Specifically, it considers a setting where the police decide whether to conduct stops based on the suspiciousness of a person's behavior and the potential liability for conducting a wrongful stop. We establish that the liability level that results in a voting equilibrium is smaller than optimal, and consequently, that excessive policing practices emerge in equilibrium.
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