Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/230270
Authors: 
Ahrens, Leo
Hakelberg, Lukas
Rixen, Thomas
Year of Publication: 
2020
Citation: 
[Journal:] Regulation & Governance [ISSN:] 1748-5991 [Volume:] [Issue:] [Pages:] n/a-n/a
Abstract: 
Abstract The multilateral adoption of the automatic exchange of information (AEI) on bank accounts held by nonresidents was a breakthrough in the fight against cross‐border tax evasion, which led to a substantial reduction in the value of bank deposits and investment portfolios in traditional tax havens. However, there is suspicion that sophisticated tax evaders engage in regulatory arbitrage of AEI provisions. We examine whether two widely discussed secrecy schemes, namely golden visas and anonymous trusts and shell corporations, have been used to circumvent information reporting. Relying on a difference‐in‐difference design, we only find scattered evidence for use of the secrecy schemes. Overall, our results suggest that regulatory arbitrage is not yet widespread, but it seems to increase over time. We thus provide evidence for the current effectiveness of the AEI but also show that closing remaining loopholes is of utmost importance. We link our findings to debates about the (im)possibility of re‐embedding neoliberal globalization.
Subjects: 
automatic exchange of taxpayer information
capital taxation
financial transparency
globalization
golden visa
tax evasion
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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