Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Gürtler, Marc
Gürtler, Oliver
Year of Publication: 
[Journal:] The RAND Journal of Economics [ISSN:] 1756-2171 [Volume:] 50 [Issue:] 4 [Pages:] 1004-1027
This article studies discrimination in a model in which promotions are used as signals of worker ability. The model can account for statistical and taste‐based discrimination. In the short run, a positive discrimination policy is beneficial for workers in the middle of the ability distribution, because these workers are promoted if and only if the policy is in place. Instead, workers of either high or low ability suffer from the policy. In the long run, the policy benefits all targeted workers. The model can explain empirical findings about the effects of a gender quota on the boards of Norwegian companies.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License:
Document Type: 
Document Version: 
Published Version

Files in This Item:

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.