Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/230201
Authors: 
Lopatta, Kerstin
Kaspereit, Thomas
Gastone, Laura‐Maria
Year of Publication: 
2020
Citation: 
[Journal:] Managerial and Decision Economics [ISSN:] 1099-1468 [Volume:] 41 [Issue:] 5 [Pages:] 800-826
Abstract: 
We show that CEOs' contribution to SG&A cost asymmetry is associated with lower shareholder value. CEO‐related excess SG&A cost stickiness of CEOs with compensation less tied to shareholder value creation and high power drive this association. Last, we provide first evidence that cost asymmetry incorporates a harmful element to the firm and shareholders, namely CEO‐related excess SG&A cost asymmetry.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.