Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/230162 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Citation: 
[Journal:] Economic Inquiry [ISSN:] 1465-7295 [Volume:] 59 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] Wiley Periodicals, Inc. [Place:] Boston, USA [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 315-328
Publisher: 
Wiley Periodicals, Inc., Boston, USA
Abstract: 
This paper develops a strategic model of procrastination in which present-biased agents prefer to perform an onerous task with someone else. This turns their decision of when to perform the task into a procrastination game—a dynamic coordination game between present-biased players. The model characterizes the conditions under which interaction mitigates or exacerbates procrastination. A procrastinator matched with a worse procrastinator may perform her task earlier than she otherwise would: she wants to avoid the increased temptation that her peer's company would generate. Procrastinators can thus use bad company as a commitment device to mitigate their self-control problem. (JEL C72, C73, D03, D91)
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Creative Commons License: 
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Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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