Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/230041 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2019
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[Journal:] Economic Inquiry [ISSN:] 1465-7295 [Volume:] 58 [Issue:] 2 [Publisher:] Wiley Periodicals, Inc. [Place:] Boston, USA [Year:] 2019 [Pages:] 980-997
Verlag: 
Wiley Periodicals, Inc., Boston, USA
Zusammenfassung: 
We examine the impact of the existence on an explicit deposit insurance (DI) scheme and its design features on bilateral cross-border deposits (CBD) in a gravity model setting. We find that both the absolute quality of a country's DI and its relative quality vis-à-vis other countries' DI generally affect depositor behavior. However, during systemic banking crises, cross-border depositors primarily seek countries with the best DI schemes. Similarly, during the 2008–2009 great financial crisis, the emergency actions taken by the governments, which supply and maintain these safe havens, have led to substantial relocations of CBD. (JEL F34, G18)
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