Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/230041
Authors: 
Qi, Shusen
Kleimeier, Stefanie
Sander, Harald
Year of Publication: 
2019
Citation: 
[Journal:] Economic Inquiry [ISSN:] 1465-7295 [Volume:] 58 [Issue:] 2 [Pages:] 980-997
Abstract: 
We examine the impact of the existence on an explicit deposit insurance (DI) scheme and its design features on bilateral cross‐border deposits (CBD) in a gravity model setting. We find that both the absolute quality of a country's DI and its relative quality vis‐à‐vis other countries' DI generally affect depositor behavior. However, during systemic banking crises, cross‐border depositors primarily seek countries with the best DI schemes. Similarly, during the 2008–2009 great financial crisis, the emergency actions taken by the governments, which supply and maintain these safe havens, have led to substantial relocations of CBD. (JEL F34, G18)
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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