Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/230019 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2019
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics [ISSN:] 1467-8292 [Volume:] 91 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] Wiley [Place:] Hoboken, NJ [Year:] 2019 [Pages:] 71-93
Verlag: 
Wiley, Hoboken, NJ
Zusammenfassung: 
We model the decisions of young individuals to stay in school or drop out and engage in criminal activities. We build on the literature on human capital and crime engagement and use the framework of Banerjee (1993) that assumes that the information needed to engage in crime arrives in the form of a rumour and that individuals update their beliefs about the profitability of crime relative to education. These assumptions allow us to study the effect of social interactions on crime. In our model, we investigate informational spillovers from the actions of talented students to less talented students. We show that policies that decrease the cost of education for talented students may increase the vulnerability of less talented students to crime. The effect is exacerbated when students do not fully understand the underlying learning dynamics.
Schlagwörter: 
Human capital
The economics of rumours
Social interactions
Urban economics
D82
D83
I28
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Dokumentart: 
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Dokumentversion: 
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