Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/229986 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2019
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Papers of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods No. 2019/14
Verlag: 
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
The paper provides mathematical foundations for modeling strategic interdependence with a continuum of agents where uncertainty has an aggregate component and an agent-specific component and the latter satisfies a conditional law of large numbers. This decomposition of uncertainty is implied by a condition of anonymity in beliefs, under which the agent in question considers the other agents’ types to be essentially pairwise exchangeable. If there is also anonymity in payoff functions, all strategically relevant aspects of beliefs are contained in an agent’s macro beliefs about the cross-section distribution of the other agents’types. The paper also gives conditions under which a function assigning macro beliefs to types is compatible with the existence of a common prior.
Schlagwörter: 
Incomplete-information games
large populations
belief functions
common priors
exchangeability
conditional independence
conditional exact law of large numbers
JEL: 
C70
D82
D83
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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