Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/229985
Authors: 
Hellwig, Martin
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Papers of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods No. 2019/13
Abstract: 
This contribution to the panel on the future to EMU discusses the tensions that arise from the fact that banks are, on the one hand, an essential element of the monetary transmission mechanism and, on the other hand, an integral part of local, regional or national polities. Banking union can eliminate or at least reduce some of the procrastination that has allowed maintained bank weaknesses to persist and harmed the transmission of monetary policy but, whereas the SSM has been fairly successful, resolution is still not working properly and needs further reforms. At the same time, banking union suffers from the problem that interventions from Brussels or Frankfurt are seen as infringements of national sovereignty that lack political legitimacy. The conflict between supranational and national interests is ultimately irresolvable but, if EMU is to survive, measures must be taken to limit its impact.
Subjects: 
Monetary union
central banking
politics of banks
banking union
bankresolution
bail-in
JEL: 
E42
E44
E51
G18
G28
G33
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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