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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/22969
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Crivelli, Ernesto | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-29T15:11:29Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-29T15:11:29Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2006 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22969 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Local governments have borrowed largely from the banking system to finance their deficits instead of responding to the rigors of bond markets. This paper analizes how sub-national governments optimally reallocate the provision of public goods and decide on borrowing, in a model where the banking system faces a soft budget constraint. In contrast with recent literature, sub-national governments allocate a higher (lower) than optimal amount of resources to consumption public goods (infrastructure investment) and overborrow if they expect the banking system to be bailed out. Controls on sub-national borrowing like the golden rule seem to be inefficient to avoid excesive indebtedness at state level. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aUniversity of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE) |cBonn | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aBonn Econ Discussion Papers |x24/2006 | en |
dc.subject.jel | R5 | en |
dc.subject.jel | H7 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Fiscal federalism | en |
dc.subject.keyword | soft budget constraints | en |
dc.subject.keyword | local public investment | en |
dc.subject.keyword | sub-national borrowing | en |
dc.title | Sub-National Optimal Budget Allocation and Borrowing under Soft Budget Constraint | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 525236260 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
dc.identifier.repec | RePEc:zbw:bonedp:242006 | - |
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