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dc.contributor.authorKovac, Eugenen
dc.contributor.authorMylovanov, Tymofiyen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:11:29Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:11:29Z-
dc.date.issued2006-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22968-
dc.description.abstractWe study relative performance of stochastic and deterministic mechanisms in a principal-agent model with hidden information and no monetary transfers. We present an example in which stochastic mechanisms perform strictly better than deterministic ones and can implement any outcome arbitrarily close to the first-best. Nevertheless, under the common assumption of quadratic payoffs and a certain regularity condition on the distribution of private information and the agent's bias, the optimal mechanism is deterministic. We provide an explicit characterization of this mechanism.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversity of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBonn Econ Discussion Papers |x23/2006en
dc.subject.jelM54en
dc.subject.jelL22en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.jelD78en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordoptimal delegationen
dc.subject.keywordcheap talken
dc.subject.keywordprincipal-agent relationshipen
dc.subject.keywordno monetary transfersen
dc.subject.keywordstochastic mechanismsen
dc.titleStochastic Mechanisms in Settings without Monetary Transfers: Regular Case-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn52523568Xen
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:bonedp:232006-

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