Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22968
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dc.contributor.authorKovac, Eugenen_US
dc.contributor.authorMylovanov, Tymofiyen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:11:29Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:11:29Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22968-
dc.description.abstractWe study relative performance of stochastic and deterministic mechanisms in a principal-agent model with hidden information and no monetary transfers. We present an example in which stochastic mechanisms perform strictly better than deterministic ones and can implement any outcome arbitrarily close to the first-best. Nevertheless, under the common assumption of quadratic payoffs and a certain regularity condition on the distribution of private information and the agent's bias, the optimal mechanism is deterministic. We provide an explicit characterization of this mechanism.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBonn econ discussion papers |x2006,23en_US
dc.subject.jelM54en_US
dc.subject.jelL22en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.jelD78en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordoptimal delegationen_US
dc.subject.keywordcheap talken_US
dc.subject.keywordprincipal-agent relationshipen_US
dc.subject.keywordno monetary transfersen_US
dc.subject.keywordstochastic mechanismsen_US
dc.titleStochastic Mechanisms in Settings without Monetary Transfers: Regular Caseen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn52523568Xen_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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