Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/22962 
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dc.contributor.authorEichberger, Jürgenen
dc.contributor.authorKelsey, David H.en
dc.contributor.authorSchipper, Burkhard C.en
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:11:25Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:11:25Z-
dc.date.issued2006-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22962-
dc.description.abstractWe report on an experiment in which subjects choose actions in strategic games with either strategic complements or substitutes against a granny, a game theorist or other subjects. The games are selected in order to test predictions on the comparative statics of equilibrium with respect to changes in strategic ambiguity. We find that subjects face higher ambiguity while playing against the granny than playing against the game theorist if we assume that subjects are ambiguity averse. Moreover, under the same assumption, subjects choose more secure actions in games more prone to ambiguity which is in line with the predictions.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversity of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBonn Econ Discussion Papers |x17/2006en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelD81en
dc.subject.jelD80en
dc.subject.jelC91en
dc.subject.jelC70en
dc.subject.jelC90en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordKnightian uncertaintyen
dc.subject.keywordChoquet expected utilityen
dc.subject.keywordequilibrium under ambiguityen
dc.subject.keywordstrategic uncertaintyen
dc.subject.keywordexperimentsen
dc.titleGranny versus Game Theorst: Ambiguity in Experimental Games-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn519435788en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:bonedp:172006-

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