Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22962
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dc.contributor.authorEichberger, Jürgenen_US
dc.contributor.authorKelsey, David H.en_US
dc.contributor.authorSchipper, Burkhard C.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:11:25Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:11:25Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22962-
dc.description.abstractWe report on an experiment in which subjects choose actions in strategic games with either strategic complements or substitutes against a granny, a game theorist or other subjects. The games are selected in order to test predictions on the comparative statics of equilibrium with respect to changes in strategic ambiguity. We find that subjects face higher ambiguity while playing against the granny than playing against the game theorist if we assume that subjects are ambiguity averse. Moreover, under the same assumption, subjects choose more secure actions in games more prone to ambiguity which is in line with the predictions.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBonn econ discussion papers |x2006,17en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelD81en_US
dc.subject.jelD80en_US
dc.subject.jelC91en_US
dc.subject.jelC70en_US
dc.subject.jelC90en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordKnightian uncertaintyen_US
dc.subject.keywordChoquet expected utilityen_US
dc.subject.keywordequilibrium under ambiguityen_US
dc.subject.keywordstrategic uncertaintyen_US
dc.subject.keywordexperimentsen_US
dc.titleGranny versus Game Theorst: Ambiguity in Experimental Gamesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn519435788en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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