Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22962
Authors: 
Eichberger, Jürgen
Kelsey, David H.
Schipper, Burkhard C.
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
Bonn econ discussion papers 2006,17
Abstract: 
We report on an experiment in which subjects choose actions in strategic games with either strategic complements or substitutes against a granny, a game theorist or other subjects. The games are selected in order to test predictions on the comparative statics of equilibrium with respect to changes in strategic ambiguity. We find that subjects face higher ambiguity while playing against the granny than playing against the game theorist if we assume that subjects are ambiguity averse. Moreover, under the same assumption, subjects choose more secure actions in games more prone to ambiguity which is in line with the predictions.
Subjects: 
Knightian uncertainty
Choquet expected utility
equilibrium under ambiguity
strategic uncertainty
experiments
JEL: 
C72
D81
D80
C91
C70
C90
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.