Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22960
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dc.contributor.authorKräkel, Matthiasen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:11:24Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:11:24Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22960-
dc.description.abstractAccording to New Institutional Economics, two or more individuals will found an organization, if it leads to a benefit compared to market allocation. A natural consequence will then be internal rent seeking. We discuss the interrelation between profits, rent seeking and the foundation of organizations. Typically, we expect that highly profitable firms are always founded but it is not clear whether the same is true for firms with less optimistic prospects. We will show that internal rent seeking may lead to a completely reversed result. The impact of internal rent seeking on overall investment and the implications of firm size and competition on the foundation of organizations are also addressed.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBonn econ discussion papers |x2006,15en_US
dc.subject.jelM2en_US
dc.subject.jelL2en_US
dc.subject.jelD2en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordcontestsen_US
dc.subject.keywordfoundation of organizationsen_US
dc.subject.keywordinternal rent seekingen_US
dc.titleOn the Adverse Selection of Organizationsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn519436237en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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