Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/229604
Authors: 
Buchholz, Wolfgang
Rübbelke, Dirk
Year of Publication: 
2020
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 8786
Abstract: 
It is explored in this paper how – depending on the agents’ preferences – an unequal income distribution may lead to a higher public good supply in a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium than in a cooperative Lindahl equilibrium that arises from a balanced income distribution. The degree of inequality that is needed for producing this result may be moderate what in particular is shown through an example with CES preferences.
Subjects: 
public good
Nash equilibrium
Lindahl equilibrium
income distribution
JEL: 
D31
H41
Q54
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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