Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/22952 
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-FeldWertSprache
dc.contributor.authorRosenkranz, Stephanieen
dc.contributor.authorSchmitz, Patrick W.en
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:11:20Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:11:20Z-
dc.date.issued2006-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22952-
dc.description.abstractThe fact that according to the celebrated Coase Theorem rational parties always try to exploit all gains from trade is usually taken as an argument against the necessity of government intervention through Pigouvian taxation in order to correct externalities. However, we show that the hold-up problem, which occurs if non-verifiable investments have external effects and parties cannot be prevented from always exploiting ex post gains from trade through Coasean bargaining, may be solved by government intervention. In this sense, the impossibility to rule out Coasean bargaining (after investments are sunk) may in fact justify Pigouvian taxation.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversity of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBonn Econ Discussion Papers |x7/2006en
dc.subject.jelL14en
dc.subject.jelH23en
dc.subject.jelH21en
dc.subject.jelD62en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordHold-up problemen
dc.subject.keywordBargainingen
dc.subject.keywordContractsen
dc.subject.keywordTaxationen
dc.subject.keywordExternalitiesen
dc.subject.stwCoase-Theoremen
dc.subject.stwInternalisierung externer Effekteen
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungstheorieen
dc.titleCan Coasean bargaining justify Pigouvian taxation?-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn51141241Xen
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:bonedp:72006-

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
339.58 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.