Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/229522 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2020
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 8704
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
In credence goods markets, experts have better information about the appropriate quality of treatment than their customers. Experts may exploit their informational advantage by defrauding customers. Market institutions have been shown theoretically to be effective in mitigating fraudulent expert behavior. We analyze whether this positive result carries over to a situation in which experts are heterogeneous in their diagnostic abilities. We find that efficient market outcomes are always possible. However, inefficient equilibria can also exist. If, in equilibrium, experts provide diagnosis-independent treatments, an increase in experts’ ability or in the probability of high-ability experts might not improve relative market efficiency.
Schlagwörter: 
credence good
diagnosis
expert
fraud
overtreatment
undertreatment
JEL: 
D82
L15
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
Erscheint in der Sammlung:

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
596.25 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.