Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/229501
Authors: 
Kim, Jeongbin
Lim, Wooyoung
Schweighofer-Kodritsch, Sebastian
Year of Publication: 
2020
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 8683
Abstract: 
We generalize the Rubinstein (1982) bargaining model by disentangling payoff delay from bargaining delay. We show that our extension is isomorphic to generalized discounting with dynamic consistency and characterize the unique equilibrium. Using a novel experimental design to control for various confounds, we then test comparative statics predictions with respect to time discounting. All bargaining takes place within a single experimental session, so bargaining delay is negligible and dynamic consistency holds by design, while payoff delay per disagreement round is significant and randomized transparently at the individual level (week/month, with/without front-end delay). In contrast to prior experiments, we obtain strong behavioral support for the basic predictions that hold regardless of the details of discounting. Testing differential predictions of different forms of discounting, we strongly reject exponential discounting in favor of present-biased discounting.
Subjects: 
alternating-offers bargaining
time preferences
present bias
laboratory experiments
JEL: 
C78
C91
D03
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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