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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/22949
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Kräkel, Matthias | en |
dc.contributor.author | Sliwka, Dirk | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-29T15:11:18Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-29T15:11:18Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2006 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22949 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We discuss a principal-agent model in which the principal has the opportunity to include a non-compete agreement in the employment contract. We show that if the agent faces limited liability and there is an incentive problem the principal prefers not to impose such a clause if and only if the principal's profits from entering the market are sufficiently large relative to the agent's outside option. If the principal can impose a fine on the agent for leaving the firm, she will never prefer a non-compete agreement. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aUniversity of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE) |cBonn | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aBonn Econ Discussion Papers |x4/2006 | en |
dc.subject.jel | J3 | en |
dc.subject.jel | M5 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D86 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D21 | en |
dc.subject.jel | K1 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | fine | en |
dc.subject.keyword | incentives | en |
dc.subject.keyword | incomplete contracts | en |
dc.subject.keyword | non-compete agreements | en |
dc.subject.keyword | option contract | en |
dc.title | Should You Allow Your Agent to Become Your Competitor? On Non-Compete Agreements in Employment Contracts | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 510390056 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
dc.identifier.repec | RePEc:zbw:bonedp:42006 | - |
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