Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22949
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dc.contributor.authorKräkel, Matthiasen_US
dc.contributor.authorSliwka, Dirken_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:11:18Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:11:18Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22949-
dc.description.abstractWe discuss a principal-agent model in which the principal has the opportunity to include a non-compete agreement in the employment contract. We show that not imposing such an agreement can be beneficial for the principal as the possibility to leave the firm generates implicit incentives for the agent. The principal prefers to impose such a clause if and only if the value created is su? ciently small relative to the agent´s outside option. If the principal can use an option contract for retaining the agent, she will never prefer a strict non-compete agreement.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBonn econ discussion papers |x2006,4en_US
dc.subject.jelJ3en_US
dc.subject.jelM5en_US
dc.subject.jelD86en_US
dc.subject.jelD21en_US
dc.subject.jelK1en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordfineen_US
dc.subject.keywordincentivesen_US
dc.subject.keywordincomplete contractsen_US
dc.subject.keywordnon-compete agreementsen_US
dc.subject.keywordoption contracten_US
dc.titleShould You Allow Your Agent to Become Your Competitor?: On Non-Compete Agreements in Employment Contractsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn510390056en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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