Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/22937 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2005
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers No. 31/2005
Verlag: 
University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
We use an experiment to explore how subjects learn to play against computers which are programmed to follow one of a number of standard learning algorithms. The learning theories are (unbeknown to subjects) a best response process, fictitious play, imitation, reinforcement learning, and a trial & error process. We test whether subjects try to influence those algorithms to their advantage in a forward-looking way (strategic teaching). We find that strategic teaching occurs frequently and that all learning algorithms are subject to exploitation with the notable exception of imitation. The experiment was conducted, both, on the internet and in the usual laboratory setting. We find some systematic differences, which however can be traced to the different incentives structures rather than the experimental environment
Schlagwörter: 
learning
fictitious play
imitation
reinforcement . trial & error
strategic teaching
Cournot duopoly
experiments
internet
JEL: 
D43
L13
C72
C92
C91
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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