Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22934
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorChakrabarti, Subhadipen_US
dc.contributor.authorGilles, Robert Paulen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:11:09Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:11:09Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22934-
dc.description.abstractA network payoff function assigns a utility to all participants in a (social) network. In this paper we discuss properties of such network payoff functions that guarantee the existence of certain types of pairwise stable networks and the convergence of certain network formation processes. In particular we investigate network payoff functions that admit an exact network potential or an ordinal network potential. We relate these network potentials to exact and ordinal potentials of a non-cooperative network formation game based on consent in link formation. Our main results extend and strengthen the current insights in the literature on game theoretic approaches to social network formation.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBonn econ discussion papers |x2005,28en_US
dc.subject.jelC79en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelD85en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordNetwork formationen_US
dc.subject.keywordpairwise stabilityen_US
dc.subject.keywordpotential functionsen_US
dc.titleNetwork Potentialsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn503118745en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.