Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22931
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dc.contributor.authorSchmitz, Patrick W.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:11:08Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:11:08Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22931-
dc.description.abstractConsider an employer who wants her employee to work hard. As is well known from the efficiency wage literature, the employer must pay the (wealth-constrained) employee a positive rent to provide incentives for exerting unobservable effort. Alternatively, the employer could make effort observable by costly workplace surveillance. It is argued that a privacy protection law preventing surveillance may increase the total surplus. While such a law reduces the employer?s profit, this loss can be overcompensated by the employee?s gain, because the employer invests in surveillance not only to implement higher effort, but also to reduce the employee?s rent.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBonn econ discussion papers |x2005,25en_US
dc.subject.jelK31en_US
dc.subject.jelJ83en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordPrivacy protection lawsen_US
dc.subject.keywordworkplace surveillanceen_US
dc.subject.keywordmoral hazarden_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitsbedingungenen_US
dc.subject.stwKontrolleen_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitnehmerschutzen_US
dc.subject.stwEffizienzlohnen_US
dc.subject.stwMoral Hazarden_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleWorkplace surveillance, privacy protection, and efficiency wagesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn500985685en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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