Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/22931 
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dc.contributor.authorSchmitz, Patrick W.en
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:11:08Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:11:08Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22931-
dc.description.abstractConsider an employer who wants her employee to work hard. As is well known from the e.ciency wage literature, the employer must pay the (wealth-constrained) employee a positive rent to provide incentives for exerting unobservable e.ort. Alternatively, the employer could make effort observable by costly workplace surveillance. It is argued that a privacy protection law preventing surveillance may increase the total surplus. While such a law reduces the employer’s profit, this loss can be overcompensated by the employee’s gain, because the employer invests in surveillance not only to implement higher effort, but also to reduce the employee’s rent.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversity of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBonn Econ Discussion Papers |x25/2005en
dc.subject.jelK31en
dc.subject.jelJ83en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordPrivacy protection lawsen
dc.subject.keywordworkplace surveillanceen
dc.subject.keywordmoral hazarden
dc.subject.stwArbeitsbedingungenen
dc.subject.stwKontrolleen
dc.subject.stwArbeitnehmerschutzen
dc.subject.stwEffizienzlohnen
dc.subject.stwMoral Hazarden
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleWorkplace surveillance, privacy protection, and efficiency wages-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn500985685en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:bonedp:252005-

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