Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/22927 
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dc.contributor.authorBudde, Jörgen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:11:06Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:11:06Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22927-
dc.description.abstractThe problem of designing tournament contracts under limited liability and alternative performance measures is considered. Under risk neutrality, only the best performing agent receives an extra premium if the liability constraint becomes binding. Under risk aversion, more than one prize is awarded. In both situations, performance measures can be ranked if their likelihood ratio distribution functions differ by a mean preserving spread. The latter result is applied to questions of contest design and more general forms of relative performance payment.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversity of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBonn Econ Discussion Papers |x21/2005en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.jelM52en
dc.subject.jelM54en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordcontesten
dc.subject.keywordinformationen
dc.subject.keywordlikelihood ratio distributionen
dc.subject.keywordtournamenten
dc.titleInformation in tournaments under limited liability-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn500984883en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:bonedp:212005-

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